The aim of the paper is to assess the potential benefits from trade facilitation in terms of increased trade flows both on average and specifically for the six regional groupings of ACP countries negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU. We use data from the World Bank's Doing Business Database on the time required to export or import as indicators of cross-border transaction costs. A gravity model on two-way bilateral trade between 22 EU countries and 106 developing countries is estimated using a sample selection approach. We find that time delays both on the part of the exporter and the importer on average significantly decrease trade flows. We also find that this relationship is not linear: an extra day of waiting has smaller marginal effects if the time requirements are already high. On average, lowering border delays in the exporting country with one day from the sample mean would yield an export increasing effect of about 1 percent, while the same reduction in the importing country would give an import increase of about 0.5 percent. More specifically, we also find that countries negotiating in the EPA groups for SADC, West Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), and the Caribbean have negative and significant effects from export transaction costs, as do EU and non-ACP developing countries. The effects for the SADC, West Africa and ESA groups are the largest. Countries in the Pacific, SADC, West Africa and the EU have significantly negative effects from import transaction costs, with the effects being largest for the two former groups. The results are generally robust to a number of alternative estimation methods such as Poisson estimation, IV estimation and the sample selection approach suggested by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) .
Introduction
The subject of trade facilitation, i.e. loosely speaking measures to lower transaction costs related to cross-border trade procedures, has emerged as an important issue in the current trade policy debate. This increased focus is no doubt related to the fact that many tariff and non-tariff barriers have been reduced or eliminated in the past rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, thus increasing the relative costs of inefficient trade procedures. It is perhaps also an easier subject to tackle than some other imminent questions, considering that no country gains in any obvious sense from having burdensome procedures. In the words of European Union (EU) Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson: "there are no losers from trade facilitation reform, only winners"
1 .
In the World Trade Organization (WTO), trade facilitation is one of the four socalled Singapore issues, 2 all of which at one stage was supposed to be included in the Doha Development Agenda, but where trade facilitation now is the only one remaining. In this paper, our goal is firstly to assess how large effects export and import transaction costs related to cross-border trade procedures have on trade flows on average and hence how big the potential benefits from trade facilitation are, and secondly, to decompose these effects to see the specific potential for each EPA negotiating group as 1 See Nath and Mandelson (2006) . Obviously, this is not strictly true, since some parties, such as customs officials, might lose from the inability to charge bribes, or from losing their jobs due to more efficient cross-border procedures. From a country welfare perspective though, one does indeed expect gains. 2 The others being trade and investment, competition policy and transparency in government procurements. 3 For an overview of the work going on in the WTO and in the negotiations, see WTO (2006) .
well as for the EU. 4 To this end, we use data from the World Bank's (2007) Doing Business Database on the time required to export or import in 2005 as indicators of trade transaction costs. We estimate a gravity model on two-way bilateral trade between 22 EU countries and 106 developing countries using a sample selection approach. In the model, the average effects from export and import transaction costs are estimated separately, and the relationship between transaction costs and trade flows is allowed to be non-linear through the inclusion of quadratic transaction cost terms. By including several interaction terms, we can also estimate the specific effect that trade transaction costs have on the EU and each EPA group. Hence, we can get an estimate on how much trade would increase if the transaction costs could be lowered, i.e. by successful trade facilitation reform, both on average and specifically for EPA negotiating groups and the EU.
To the best of our knowledge, the potential effects of trade facilitation on EPA groups have not been estimated before. Besides looking at a new question, on of the main contributions of the paper compared with other papers in the general area of trade facilitation, is that it uses a less restrictive model, allowing trade facilitation in both the exporting and the importing country to affect bilateral trade flows, as well as allowing the effect of trade facilitation to be non-linear. Further, it takes recent methodological developments into account and, besides the main alternative of Heckman estimation, estimates the model using a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood estimator, instrumental variables estimation, and a new sample selection approach suggested by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) . The data on the time requirements for exports have been used before, but not the data on border delays in the importing country.
To summarize our results, we find that time delays both on the part of the exporter and the importer, proxying export and import transaction costs, on average significantly decrease trade flows. We also find that this relationship is not linear: an extra day of waiting has smaller marginal effects if the time requirements are already high. On average, lowering border delays in the exporting country with one day (from the sample mean) would yield an export increasing effect of about 1 percent, while the same reduction in the importing country would give an import increase of about 0.5 percent.
Further, we find that countries negotiating in the EPA groups for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), West Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), and the Caribbean have negative and significant effects from export transaction costs, as do EU and non-ACP developing countries. Countries in the Pacific, SADC, West Africa and the EU have significantly negative effects from import transaction costs.
Reducing border delays with one day from the within-group mean would increase exports with between 1 and 8 percent, and the percentage effects of reducing import border delays are generally of the same magnitude.
The next section will define trade facilitation more thoroughly and give an overview of the framework for the EPA negotiations. Section three presents some previous research. In section four, the methodology and data are discussed, where after the estimation results are presented and interpreted. Section five summarizes and concludes.
Background

Trade Facilitation Defined
Despite the recent years' increased attention to trade facilitation, there is no real consensus on how the term should be defined. Generally, there are at least two broad ways of looking at the issue: either to use a narrow focus on what has been called "at the border" procedures, or to use a wider perspective and also include so called "behind the border" measures.
One common way to narrowly define trade facilitation originates with the WTO, and is e.g. used by Engman (2005) In this study, we choose to work with the same kind of narrow perspective on trade facilitation as Engman (2005) . Borrowing a line from Roy and Bagai (2005) 
Economic Partnership Agreements
In June 2000, relations between the EU and ACP countries began to change with the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. This agreement, which entered into force in April 5 Note that the negotiations in the WTO are supposed to cover GATT article V (freedom of transit), article VIII (fees and formalities connected with importation and exportation) and article X (publication and administration of trade regulations); see WTO (2006) . 6 Trade facilitation is clearly linked to the broader issue of Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (NTBs), but the latter includes many more obstacles to trade. Even more generally, trade facilitation belongs to the literature on trade costs -for an overview see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004 Hinkle et al (2006) . 
Previous Studies
There is a growing literature on the effects of trade facilitation, but to the best of our knowledge, no previous study has looked at this issue in the context of the EU's relations with ACP countries. This section therefore gives an overview of some studies that quantify the effects of trade facilitation in general or in some specific other contexts.
Generally, these papers have tended to use either a gravity approach or a Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) model. Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006) use the same data as this paper, i.e. World Bank (2007) , and estimate how time delays affect exports with the use of a gravity model. 10 Their preferred way of estimation is a difference gravity equation estimated on similar exporters, i.e. exporters that are similar in location and factor endowments and face the same trade barriers in foreign markets. Looking only at delays in the exporting country, their main result is that, on average, for each additional day that a product is delayed, trade is reduced by at least 1 percent. They also find that developing country 9 Specifically, they have few developing countries, and especially only have data for Mauritius, Nigeria and South Africa for Sub-Saharan Africa. This is one major reason why we do not use the same data, since this would make it impossible to estimate effects on most EPA groups. Note that the variable customs environment, which is only included for the importing country, is the one that most closely resembles our indicators for potential trade facilitation. 10 Note though that they use an earlier version of the data that has now been somewhat modified for a number of countries.
Gravity Model Studies
exports are significantly more affected by delays, and that exports of time-sensitive goods are more influenced by exporters having to wait at the border.
Nordås, Pinali and Grosso (2006) Report. Control of corruption is generally found to affect both the probability and volume of exports positively, while the time for exports in most cases have a negative impact on both the probability to export and the exported volumes.
Soloaga, Wilson and Mejía (2006) use the same methodology and type of data as in Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2005) , but estimate the gravity model with a negative binomial regression. Unlike in the latter study, they choose to include customs efficiency also for the exporter. Most of the results are fairly similar to those obtained in Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2005) , but puzzlingly, while they find the expected positive and significant effect from customs efficiency in the exporting country, the corresponding coefficient is robustly negative and significant for the importing country.
Other Approaches
There are some studies that use CGE models to simulate the effects of trade facilitation.
OECD (2003) (2006) and Decreux and Fontagné (2006) all simulate the effects of potential outcomes of the Doha Round, covering the areas of non-agricultural market access, agricultural liberalization, services liberalization and trade facilitation. While using different ways to model trade facilitation, all studies find that a large portion of the potential gains from a Doha Agreement would come from trade facilitation. Generally, developing countries as a group are found to be large gainers. Hertel and Keeney (2006) , focusing on agricultural reforms under the Doha Round, also find large potential gains from trade facilitation. Lastly, Dennis (2006) finds that, when trade facilitation is added to regional liberalization initiatives within the Middle East and North Africa region, or with the EU, the welfare gains become between 3 and 4 times higher.
In addition to these CGE studies, another interesting study is Hummels (2001) . In that paper, it is estimated that each additional day spent in transport reduces the probability that the US will import from a particular country by 1 -1.5 percent. Also, each day that is saved in terms of shipping is estimated to represent 0.8 percent of the value of manufactured goods.
Methodology
This section starts by discussing the model that we estimate to find potential effects of trade facilitation on average and on each single EPA grouping. Then, we describe the data used to measure the trade transaction costs that trade facilitation is meant to lower.
Lastly, the estimation results are presented and interpreted.
Model and Estimation Issues
To answer the question how cumbersome cross-border trade procedures affect trade flows on average, and also specifically what the effects look like for the EPA groups and the EU, we estimate a gravity equation including measures for export and import transaction costs. The model is estimated on two-way trade flows between EU countries and developing countries.
The gravity equation has been widely used to estimate the effects of e.g.
preferential trading arrangements and various trade costs, 11 but has also at times been criticized for lacking a solid theoretical basis. There is, however, a growing consensus 11 For an overview of its application to preferential trade, see Greenaway and Milner (2002) .
that this is not the case, and among the papers often cited are Anderson (1979) , Bergstrand (1985; 1989) , Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Deardorff (1998) . We choose to use a model originating with Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . They derive the gravity model using assumptions of constant elasticity of consumption (CES) preferences and goods being differentiated by place of origin. In the model, Anderson and van Wincoop assume unitary income elasticities, and include so called multilateral resistance terms.
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Based on Anderson and van Wincoop's derivation, in its original multiplicative form, the model used is:
(1)
In the model, M ij is imports to country i from country j. Y i Y j is the product of the countries' incomes measured as real GDP, and to be less restrictive than in the original model, income elasticities are allowed to differ from one. Trade flows are modelled to depend on the bilateral distance between the countries' capital, D ij . We include a vector X ij of bilateral variables that might affect trade: dummy variables capturing whether country i and j share a border, the same language, or have ever been in a colonial relationship. Further, there are two vectors of importer (Z i ) and exporter (W j ) specific variables: the latter includes land area, population size, a dummy for being landlocked, and a dummy for being a major oil exporter while the former in addition contains tariff level and a measure of tariff dispersion: for a description of all variables, including data sources, see the Appendix. 13 Since the effects of several variables might be expected to 12 Capturing the fact that for any given level of bilateral barriers between countries i and j, if i has high barriers to its other trade partners, this will reduce the relative price of country j goods, and hence increase imports from j. 13 Most of these variables are quite standard and are meant to capture various forms of trade costs (such as being landlocked) or lack thereof (such as sharing the same language). Land area is not always used, but is included here as a proxy for infrastructure: particularly for developing countries, a large land area can be expected to be associated with higher transportation costs. Population is included to allow for the possibility of non-homothetic preferences. The inclusion of a dummy for oil exporters is motivated by the fact that the dependent variable is total trade. Since oil is a special commodity, not controlling for this in some way would risk giving misleading conclusions.
differ between developed and developing countries, the coefficients are allowed to be different for developing and EU countries respectively by also adding all variables interacted with an EU dummy. We include regional exporter effects for developing countries (see below) that by construction capture the EU tariff level, so the tariff variables are only included for developing countries. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) emphasize the importance of controlling for multilateral resistance, and suggest that one way of doing this is to include exporter and importer specific effects. Due to the country-specific nature of the export and import transaction costs whose effects we want to capture, we cannot include specific effects for every exporter and importer. However, we include region-specific exporter and importer effects. This should to some extent capture the multilateral resistance effects, as well as more generally effects of heterogeneity, as long as this heterogeneity is common within small regions, but differ between them. Specifically, we add exporter and importer specific dummy variables for every EPA group and likewise for seven different geographical regions. For a list of these, see the Appendix.
To capture the average potential impact of trade facilitation, there are measures of the degree of export transaction costs in the exporting country j: TFE j , and import transaction costs in the importing country i: TFI i . These are measured as the number of days needed to export or import a standardized good. The hypothesis is that transaction costs will decrease trade flows whether they occur in the exporting country or at the destination, so we expect these coefficients to be negative. Further, since the effects of transaction costs are not necessarily linear, but rather the marginal effect could be expected to decline at higher levels of costs, the square of these export and import transaction costs are also added to the model. We expect their coefficients to be positive.
ε ij is a disturbance term. any EPA grouping. To get the effect for EU and EPA countries, the additional effect stemming from transaction costs for these countries must be added to this main effect by summing the relevant coefficients.
To estimate this model, we choose to use a simple sample selection model. As noted by e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) , when the gravity model is estimated with OLS on its log-linear form, as is often the case, all country-pairs that have zero trade flows are excluded from the regression, which introduces a bias. One way to solve this problem is to first model a selection process where the probability that a country-pair trades is estimated using probit estimation, and then use this information in a second step estimation of trade volumes. This is just the standard Heckman procedure for 
Data
The data used to measure the potential for trade facilitation comes from the World Bank Transaction costs at border crossings can arise due to a number of reasons, but likely, the time required to export or import a good will be a good proxy for all these transaction costs. For instance, having to collect many signatures or fill out many documents might involve direct costs, but it will also increase the time needed to get the good through customs. Port congestion and waiting due to insufficient staffing etc, will also lead to higher time requirements. In turn, as noted by Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006) , long time delays will act as a tax on exports (or imports) due to at least three factors: depreciation of the good, resources being allocated to storage and transport instead of other uses, and the fact that long delays are associated with increased uncertainty about delivery times. Therefore, we argue that border delays are not only a good indicator for the customs environment, but more specifically, a good proxy for the transaction costs that trade facilitation is meant to lower.
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The data on the number of days needed to export or import the standardized good is available for 155 countries for 2005. Part of the data has been used to measure trade facilitation in Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006) . However, unlike that paper, we use the data over time needed for both exports and imports, corresponding to the hypothesis that not only what a country does on its own matters, but the situation in its trading partners will also affect bilateral trade flows.
There are some possible concerns with using this data as an indicator of potential trade facilitation. OECD (2003) note that the indirect costs that arise due to waiting at the border might differ, not only between countries, which we do measure with our data, but also within countries due to the sensitivity of the good and the size of the firm. If this is the case, the measure of trade facilitation we use is not ideal, since this by design only captures the time it takes a large firm to export or import a relatively time-insensitive good. A further problem with the data, related to this, is that for every country, we only know the average time needed to export or import to all countries. If the composition of trade varies with trading partners, this is not a very good measure for the transaction costs in a specific bilateral trade flow. We try to explore the consequences of this in the robustness section below, but we would argue that the specific sample that we use reduces the problem. We include bilateral trade flows between EU countries and developing countries, where the composition of trade can be expected to be more even than if we had also included trade between developing countries, or between industrialized countries. Further, there is likely a high correlation between the time requirements for different kinds of goods, so if border delays for the survey's standardized good are large, this should be a good indicator of a generally inefficient customs environment.
Using the Doing Business Database to measure the potential for trade facilitation gives us a sample of 22 EU countries: Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta disappear. To get a well-defined sample of developing countries, all countries that were eligible for preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) are included. As is the case with the EU, some countries disappear due to missing data. The sample of the delays in the sample are due to "administrative hurdles" -customs procedures, tax procedures, clearances and cargo inspections (Djankov, Freund and Pham, 2006) . developing countries can be seen in the Appendix, together with a description of the other data used, including sources.
Descriptive Statistics
It is interesting to look at some descriptive statistics for the measures of potential trade facilitation. Starting with the time that is required to export a good, as is evident from Within the EU, there are also large differences, with time delays ranging from only 3 days in Estonia up to 29 in Greece. The group of countries that neither belongs to any EPA group, nor to the EU has an average of about 33 days, which is quite a lot lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa EPA groups, but higher than the average for Pacific countries. This group of non-ACP 17 developing countries forms the reference group in the regressions, so it is interesting to note how diverse the group is: the difference between the minimum and the maximum number of days is over 90 days.
The same pattern arises when we look at the time required for importing a good, presented in table 3. Again, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have high time barriers on average, compared with non-ACP developing countries, while Pacific countries are close to the EU mean. There are big differences within the groups though. In Eastern and Southern Africa for instance, importers only have to wait an average of 16 days in Mauritius, while the corresponding delay is 124 days in Burundi. As expected, it generally takes a longer time to import a good than to export it. 
Empirical Results
The results from the Heckman estimation of the model is presented in table 9 in the Appendix. 18 The model is first estimated without separating the effects for EPA configurations and EU countries; see column 1. Starting with the usual gravity variables, the results are generally in line with what could be expected. The product of the exporter's and the importer's GDP is highly significant with a coefficient fairly close to unity. Distance has the expected negative and highly significant effect on imports. Land area, perhaps surprisingly, has a positive and significant effect on exports for developing countries, but this effect is significantly smaller for EU exporters. By contrast, land area is not significant for importing developing countries, while it has a significantly more negative effect for EU countries. For developing countries, population size does not 18 The model is estimated using STATA's Heckman, twostep command with bootstrapped standard errors.
affect either exports or imports, while EU countries have significantly more positive effects from population size both for exports and imports. Having a common border, sharing the same language and having been in a colonial relationship has positive significant effects on trade flows. Landlocked developing countries both export and import significantly less, and EU countries have a significantly less negative effect on exports from being landlocked. LDCs both export and import significantly less, as do major oil exporters. The average tariff in developing countries has a significant negative impact on imports, and there is also a significant negative effect from the tariff dispersion variable: if high tariffs are concentrated on certain sectors, interpreted as tariff peaks, this is negative for trade flows.
Looking at the variables of real interest, both the average level of export transaction costs and import transaction costs have the expected negative coefficients, and both are highly significant. The magnitude of the coefficient for export transaction costs is somewhat larger at -1.5, with the corresponding coefficient for import transaction costs being about -1.3. These coefficients are of the same magnitude as the coefficient for distance. Interestingly, the squared trade facilitation variables are also significant and have the expected positive sign. A reasonable interpretation must therefore be that border delays, proxying indirect trade transaction costs, on average have a significant negative effect on trade flows both when they occur in the exporting country, and at the destination. The marginal effect of an extra day of waiting is however not constant: when the level of transaction costs is already high, waiting a little longer will be less harmful than it would have been at lower levels.
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Turning now to the baseline model estimated with interaction effects for EPA groups and the EU, the results can be seen in column two of table 9. For most variables, the results are very similar to the model without interaction effects. The results for the 19 Since we use a Heckman procedure, the first stage probit estimation gives us some extra results concerning the impact of various variables on the likelihood that positive trade flows occur between two countries. This paper focuses on the effect on trade volumes from trade transaction costs, so we will not have much to say about this issue, but the results are displayed in table 9. For most variables, the effect on the likelihood of trade and on trade volumes goes in the same direction, but there are some exceptions, such as the fact that being a major oil exporter has a negative effect on import volumes, but increases the likelihood that imports at all will take place. Further, in some specifications, we get different signs for the import transaction costs variables in the first and second stage estimations. We do not have a good explanation for this.
trade facilitation variables are reproduced in table 4. It is important to note the different interpretation: Before the inclusion of interaction effects for EPA and EU countries, the main transaction cost variables for exports, TFE, and imports, TFI, measured the average effect of transaction costs for all countries. Now, they measure the average effect for the reference group not included in any interaction terms, i.e. developing, non-ACP countries. Before we describe these results, note that the coefficients for the squared transaction cost terms are still positive, but only significant at the exporting side.
Starting with column 1, the reference group of developing non-ACP countries has a negative and significant coefficient for export transaction costs. Apart from this, only the coefficients for ESA and SADC are significant and negative. Thus, countries in ESA and SADC have a significantly larger negative effect than the average non-ACP developing country. Note: Estimated coefficients for export transaction costs (TFE) and import transaction costs (TFI) from the baseline model are displayed in columns 1 and 3, while columns 2 and 4 show the sum of the reference group effect and the deviation, thus giving the full effect for each relevant group. Robust bootstrapped p-values in brackets. Stars denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
To see the full effect for all groups, the relevant coefficients are added together in column two. As can be seen, all coefficients are fairly large and have the expected negative sign, and are further significant for all groups but Central Africa and the Pacific. So for countries in West Africa, ESA, SADC, the Caribbean and the EU, export transaction costs have significantly negative effects on export flows. The largest negative effects are found for SADC.
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Looking now at the corresponding coefficients for import transaction costs, a first thing to notice in column three is that the reference group coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Hence, we cannot find any negative effects from import transaction costs for the average non-ACP developing country. This means that the other coefficients in column three really could be interpreted as the full import transaction cost effects, since they capture the deviation from the reference group, i.e. the deviation from zero.
Noting that the coefficients for Western Africa, ESA, SADC, the Pacific and the EU all are negative and significant, one can therefore interpret this as saying that these groups, unlike the average non-ACP developing countries, experience a significantly negative effect from import transaction costs. For completeness, the relevant coefficients are also added together in column four, but we would argue that column three is the relevant one to study. One interesting thing to notice is that, for almost all cases, the coefficients for export transaction costs are larger than for import transaction costs, suggesting that border delays at the origin would be more of a problem than inefficient border procedures at the destination. The only exception to this rule is the group of Pacific countries, where we cannot find any evidence of significant effects from export transaction costs, while they have a large, significantly negative effect from import transaction costs.
Having found evidence suggesting that delays at the border by giving rise to transaction costs can influence trade flows, a natural policy question is how much that can be gained by reducing these border delays. Using coefficients from the baseline regression without interaction effects, we find that for the whole sample, lowering border delays from the mean with one day would yield an export increasing effect of about 1 percent. The corresponding import trade facilitation would result in an increase of about 0.5 percent.
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Turning again to the interaction effects specification, Tables 5 and 6 contain some illustrative examples of how much the EPA groups could gain in terms of increased exports and imports by engaging in trade facilitation. , where δ(φ ) refers to either the import (export) transaction cost coefficient from the baseline model without interactions, or, in the specification with EPA interactions, the sum of the reference group effect and the relevant EPA group deviation, and θ is the coefficient for the squared import or export transaction cost term. When calculating the effects from import transaction costs in the EPA interaction specification, the expression simplifies since the coefficient 2 θ is not significantly different from zero. In this case, we also choose to use the coefficients for the EPA or EU interaction terms directly, since the reference group effect also is non-significantly different from zero.
further illustrated in columns two and three, where it is evident that countries that already have small border delays would get larger effects from reducing them with one day. Note: Figures show the percentage effects on imports from lowering the time needed at the border with one day from the mean number of days, the minimum number, and the maximum number. Concerning the calculation, see footnote 21.
Looking at the potential effects from import trade facilitation in table 6, the differences between various initial levels of border delays are less pronounced, which is natural since these figures are calculated without taking non-linearity into account (on the grounds that the relevant coefficient was not significantly different from zero). West Africa, SADC and the EU see sizeable effects, but smaller than in the export case. The effect for Eastern and Southern Africa is about the same, but the main difference is that when looking at imports, Caribbean countries do not have any significant effect, while Pacific countries according to our results would get a vary large effect. 
Robustness
To make sure that the results are general and not just depend on the estimation method or the particular model being estimated, we subject the results to a number of robustness checks. Firstly, we try alternative estimation methods. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) , argue that the gravity equation should be estimated using a Poisson Pseudo-MaximumLikelihood (PPML) estimator on its original multiplicative form. The PPML estimator is, unlike the method of estimating the log-linearized equation with ordinary least squares (OLS), consistent, even in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Since a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity suggests that this might indeed be a problem, we try estimating with the PPML estimator on the gravity equation in its multiplicative form. 23 The results are displayed in table 9. We consider the Poisson estimation to be the main alternative to a sample selection process, so the model is estimated both with (column 3) and without (column 4) interaction terms for EPA groups.
Further, as noted by Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006) , endogeneity might be a concern, since trade volumes might not only be affected by border delays, but also in its turn affect waiting time. For instance, large trade volumes might cause congestion, thus intensifying the problems with inefficient procedures, or, it could on the other hand put more pressure on the government to actually use efficient procedures. To see whether this affects our results, we estimate the model with IV estimation, using the number of documents needed for exports and imports and the level of corruption in the exporting and importing country as instruments for the trade transaction variables. 24 The results are shown in column 5 of table 9.
As noted above, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) argue that when estimating the gravity equation, one should not only control for sample selection, which the ordinary Heckman procedure does, but also for the fraction of exporting firms. We use their proposed estimation strategy (from now on the HMR approach), but unlike them, we do not estimate the second stage non-linear equation with maximum likelihood, but choose to use non-linear least squares. The results are shown in column 6.
Reassuringly, for almost all variables, the results are the same regardless of estimation method. Looking specifically at the transaction cost variables, export transaction costs have a very robust negative significant effect on trade flows, and the squared term is also robustly positively significant. Results for import transaction costs are somewhat less robust: ignoring for now the specification with interaction terms, the 23 Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) note that for the PPML estimator to be consistent, the data do not have to be Poisson distributed, and in fact, the dependent variable does not even have to be an integer. The model is estimated on the original multiplicative form of the model using STATA's poisson command with robust standard errors. 24 These variables are less likely to be influenced by trade flows. The model is estimated using STATA's ivreg2 command with robust standard errors. We find it difficult to instrument for all interaction terms, so we use the model with only average effects for all countries.
import transaction cost coefficient is negative and significant using Heckman, IV and the HMR approach, but not using Poisson estimation. The corresponding squared term is always positive, but only significant using Heckman or HMR. This suggests firstly that one may be slightly more confident regarding the export transaction costs results, and secondly that even if endogeneity is a problem, taking it into account does not alter any results in a fundamental way.
Looking also at the results for the EPA interaction terms, We also include the proportion of GDP coming from agriculture. The reason for this is that our measures for cross-border transaction costs really only apply to a certain standardized good that is not very time-sensitive. Agricultural exports are likely more time-sensitive, which means that problems with long waiting at the border could be worse for agricultural exporters. We also try including the share of exports and imports respectively from the US, again as a way to control for the content of trade.
Including these extra control variables generally does very little to alter the results. With the only exception of the squared export transaction cost variable that becomes insignificant in the specification including control of corruption, all results for the transaction cost variables remain the same. Control of corruption further has the expected positive coefficient: less corrupt countries both export and import more. Besides this, the only additional variable that has a significant effect is share of agriculture in GDP: having a large agricultural sector is associated with larger imports.
The conclusions we draw from these robustness tests are that our model and results are quite robust to both alternative estimation approaches and different specifications, and that our conclusions regarding the specific effects on EPA groups also seem to hold. In fact, our estimation strategy reassuringly seems to be both robust and conservative, in that in all almost cases for which it yields significant effects, the main alternative of Poisson estimation also yields the same result, but the latter generally suggest larger effects and also significance in some extra cases. This suggests that we may be fairly confident about the results we find. It should be borne in mind though that the average results for export transaction costs seem more robust than those for import transaction costs: the latter are significant with three of our estimation choices, but not using Poisson estimation.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have assessed how large effects export and import transaction costs Concerning the average effects of trade facilitation, our results confirm the conclusions drawn by Djankov, Fruend and Pham (2006) , Nordås, Pinali and Grosso (2006) and Soloaga, Wilson and Mejía (2006) that export trade facilitation have positive potential effects, and the magnitude of these effects closely resemble those suggested by Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006) . Estimations of the potential effects of import trade facilitation have been rarer in the literature, but our results do confirm those obtained by Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003; 2005) . Our results highlight a number of issues though.
Firstly, they illustrate the importance of including indicators for trade facilitation in both the exporting and the importing country: inefficient border procedures matter, regardless or where they occur. Secondly, our results clearly suggest that the effect of cumbersome border procedures is not linear, so a failure to take this into account can risk biasing ones results. This will be particularly important when analysing the policy implications of trade facilitation reforms. Thirdly, and related to this, it seems to be important to allow the effects of trade facilitation to differ for country groups. By just estimating one average effect and then using this to calculate potential trade impact of reform, one will run a serious risk of drawing misleading conclusions.
To draw some policy conclusions, our results suggest that there are indeed positive gains to be won by making it simpler for goods to cross borders. This general conclusion also holds for most, though not necessarily all, EPA groups. For some, gains would even be considerably larger than for the average country. Obviously, reforming the customs environment can entail certain costs, but compared with other areas of negotiation in the current discussions with the EU about EPAs, at least the benefits from trade facilitation are clear and sizeable. It is important to note, though, that the potential benefits from trade facilitation are not necessarily tied to the EPA framework: the relevant countries could increase their trade unilaterally by engaging in their own reform.
Since trade facilitation has positive effects both when it is performed at the origin and at the destination, an agreement about mutual reforms would, however, yield larger potential gains. If ACP countries e.g. aim to increase their exports, one way of doing this would be through EU import trade facilitation. This emphasizes the importance of reaching an agreement. Moreover, since trade facilitation can involve not only simplification but also harmonization, one could argue that EPA countries perhaps have a better chance of influencing which standards one is to harmonize around through negotiations, rather than just unilateral reform.
Appendix
Sample of Developing Countries Note: * (#) signifies no data on import (export) transaction costs in the baseline regression. Note: Robust p-values in brackets. Stars denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. The selection process for the HMR column is exactly the same as the one in the first column. 
